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In one of his first speeches in the aftermath of the Arab 
Spring, delivered to the Malay Student Association at 
Oxford University on 17 May 2011, the Prime Minister 
Najib Razak propagated “justly balanced moderation.”1 
As he would do in every public statement, he underlined 
“diversity, dialogue, and peaceful co-existence” as the 
prevalent teachings of the Quran, which Malaysia 
purportedly upheld. Najib also referred to “inclusivity 
and diversity” as the key tenets of Malaysia’s approach 
to international relations - an allusion to his infamous 
1Malaysia policy, which called upon the government 
agencies and civil servants to “more strongly emphasize 
ethnic harmony and national unity.”2
As discussed in further detail below, between 2011 
and 2014, moderation evolved into a recurrent theme 
in Najib’s public appearances. The Prime Minister 
constructed a profile for Malaysia as a country 
that balanced national unity against its multiethnic 
composition, and intimated that the Arab Spring 
countries would be well advised to emulate its example. 
This image, however, accords ill with what is often seen 
in popular depictions of Malaysia in the international 
press. This study will therefore look beyond the rhetoric 
of moderation, and explore the reason behind Najib’s 
flirtation with such diplomatic courtesies. Najib’s 
statements are rightly deconstructed as a rhetorical 
shield to guard the actual wait-and-see approach that 
allowed for a more strategic reflection on how Malaysia 
should react to the prospects of the Arab World. It 
is often iterated that national self-interest is never 
surrendered in favor of humanitarian concern. Indeed, 
a closer examination of Malaysian foreign policy 
reveals that the country has failed to exhibit a strong 
commitment to virtues of moderation and tolerance. 
Najib’s peace-indexed policy then served as a template 
for political action, only when it promised to further 
Malaysia’s agenda.  
This paper will then deal with this very issue – the 
reason why Najib calculated that a hands-off approach 
to the region would forge advantageous conditions 
for the country. One factor was that, Malaysia would 
not derive any financial or political benefits from 
becoming entangled within the web of partnerships 
and responsibilities that characterize the Middle East. 
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Another factor, which weighed even more heavily 
on Najib’s decisions, was his need to appeal to his 
electorate, composed overwhelmingly of conservative 
Sunnis. Malaysia’s refusal to hurry into ironclad alliances 
pointed to a dilatory strategy. By not jumping on board 
with controversial resolutions, and thus not appearing 
at loggerheads with either the age-old dictatorships or 
newly minted governments, Malaysia aimed at shifting 
the international attention away from the home-front. In 
return, this allowed Najib to enact certain legislations 
that broadened his appeal to Malaysian conservatives 
– which were, nevertheless, sure to arouse the ire of 
the international community. 
The UN Resolutions on the Arab Spring and a 
Malaysia on the Fence 
Appraising Malaysia’s reactions towards the United 
Nations’ resolutions presents the perfect case of how 
this rationale became implemented into action. For 
instance, the Malaysian representative expressed his 
strong disapproval of the UNSC Resolution 1973, which 
would form the legal basis of a military intervention into 
Libya and against Gaddafi. Malaysia claimed that, 
only by applying pressure on the Libyan President, 
and subsequently dissuading him from employing 
instruments of violence against the civilians, could 
the conflict be brought to a permanent resolution.3 
Whether Najib genuinely believed in the effectiveness 
of this “softer” approach is irrelevant, since this concern 
was not the primary driver behind Malaysia’s posturing. 
What would have been at stake, rather, was the 
country’s reputation. Throwing support behind armed 
coalition ran the risk of being interpreted as a symbol 
of intolerance and excess, and therefore appeared at 
odds with Najib’s vision for the country. 
With the UN Resolution of 15 May 2013, however, 
Malaysia would be on board. This resolution 
“condemned violence, called for involved parties to 
immediately end the hostilities on all sides, and work 
together for an inclusive Syrian-led political transition 
to a democratic, pluralistic political transition.”4 
Furthermore, it expressed complete disapproval of 
indiscriminate use of heavy artillery and chemical 
weapons against population centers, and demanded 
that all breaches of international law be ceased. Also 
welcomed was the formation of a multilateral system 
2that “could ensure that concrete and viable steps 
contributed to a comprehensive transfer of power,” 
and eventually instigate a transition into lasting 
peace.5 Unlike the resolution on Libya, this did not 
commit the international body to armed involvement. 
As the Malaysian representative claimed, it rather 
upheld Malaysia’s stalwart conviction in the benefits 
of negotiating in good faith, bringing the parties to a 
constructive dialogue, and allowing for the people to 
determine their own future.6 The diplomatic corps 
asserted that there could be “no military answer to 
violence, [but only] a political one,” and thus did not 
entertain any reservations about voting in favor.7
Malaysia’s voice would remain subdued on the 
Syrian conflict until 21 August 2013, when the city 
of Ghouta near Damascus became targeted with 
chemical attacks. Indeed, the Malaysian commitment 
to moderation almost fell by the wayside until the 
occurrence of this outrageous breach of conscience. 
Only then did the Foreign Minister, Datuk Seri Anifah 
Aman, publicly reprimand what had been transpiring in 
Syria, “calling upon those responsible for such inhuman 
actions to be brought to justice.”8 Furthermore, Datuk 
spoke of a “clear violation of international law” only in 
the context of waging chemical warfare, and conceded 
to dispatching an international body to inspect the site.9 
What deserves to be highlighted in even starker color 
is that Malaysia had previously voiced its opposition 
against sending in any troops or contingents, describing 
an action of this nature as a violation of sovereignty. 
Yet, the reason why the Prime Minister changed tack 
at this juncture is significant. First of all, Assad’s resort 
to chemical weapons solidified the Syrian conflict as 
a humanitarian catastrophe, and prompted many 
activists, organizations and politicians to shift comfort 
to resistance to tackle this outrageous breach of 
conscience. Given the avalanche of criticism it triggered 
from the international community, it became a moral 
obligation to deliver a statement in condemnation of the 
attacks and demonstrate solidarity with virtually the rest 
of the world. This was also a case of Najib’s dilatory 
strategy. He delayed adopting a clear stance on the 
matter until a united front of resistance had already 
been formed. Chiming in with the chorus of opposition 
at this point, and thus appearing at odds with the Assad 
regime, would not have made Malaysia stand out. 
This demonstrated the way, in which Malaysia would 
conduct its international relations: in the “safest” way 
possible, where “safe” meant adopting a clear posture 
only when the “red lines” had been drawn by other 
players in the global league.   
What is Najib Trying to Hide?
Malaysia’s commitment to moderation is certainly 
praiseworthy, but does not reflect the realities on the 
ground. Far from honouring the “obligations” of a pacifist 
nation, Malaysia is experiencing a backward slide on 
the human rights agenda. Since Malaysia’s general 
elections on 5 May 2013, the Najib administration 
has become bereft of the reform-oriented spirit that 
had guided the introduction of 1Malaysia legislation. 
Under the pretext of a sharp escalation in crime 
POMEAS POLICY PAPERNo.7, JULY 2015
Far from honouring the 
“obligations” of a pacifist nation, 
Malaysia is experiencing a 
backward slide on the human 
rights agenda. 
rates, Home Minister reintroduced the Emergency 
Ordinance of 1969 (that had expired in July 2012). 
He also amended the Prevention of Crime Act 1959, 
which furnished “a five person government-appointed 
panel” with arbitrary powers: it could now sentence any 
suspect to imprisonment for up to two years without 
having its decisions submitted to judicial review.10 
Furthermore, the Peaceful Assembly Act mandated that 
organizations with a membership of over seven people 
register with the Registrar of Societies to receive their 
permit for operation; under this act, the Registrar holds 
absolute discretion to declare any society unlawful, and 
has exercised this right against several organizations 
critical of the government.11
There are also a number of antiquated legislations that 
had been introduced under previous administrations 
and have hitherto not been repealed by Najib’s 
government. Sedition Act of 1948, which criminalizes 
“any speech spoken to excite disaffection” and 
enables the administration to sentence a convict for 
up 30 years in prison, was introduced under the British 
rule and has never been repealed in the history of 
Malaysia. It has hitherto been invoked to indict dozens 
of activists, academics and civil society members that 
spoke, published, or launched protests against the 
3interrupting the dissemination of Shia literature, just as 
it had fought to roll back the tide of communism.16 
A month after the seminar on the “Shiite virus,” the 
Malaysian Appeals Court announced that newspapers, 
owned and widely read by the Catholic communities 
were prohibited from invoking the term “Allah” in 
their texts.17 Also, it should be noted that the fatwa, 
issued by the Fatwa Committee for Religious Affairs in 
1996, has still not be revoked. Imbuing anti-sectarian 
discrimination with legitimacy, this fatwa labeled Shiism 
as “deviant”: it banned the distribution of any material 
on the Shia beliefs and principles.18 In technical terms, 
this constituted a fatwa and not legislation; therefore, 
there are currently no legal penalties for the practice or 
promotion of the Shia belief in Malaysia. It is, however, 
classified as an offensive act under Criminal Offenses 
Act, and accordingly, those found in infringement of the 
law could be fined up to 3,000 ringgit (close to US$827) 
and/or face imprisonment for up to two years.19 This 
fatwa has “officially” made Malaysia more intolerant 
and more viciously anti-sectarian than Saudi Arabia, 
where a legislation of this nature does not exist. The 
Saudi legal-code also is bereft of any fatwa against 
the practice of Shiism despite the prevalent Wahhabi 
belief. 
To be Moderate: To Keep Silent Insofar 
There is therefore almost an unbridgeable gap between 
Malaysia’s self-constructed international profile as 
a representative of “moderate” Muslim nations and 
its deplorable human rights record. Malaysia will be 
chairing the ASEAN and holding a non-permanent 
seat at the UNSC in 2015; this means that its human 
rights record will be subject to closer scrutiny. One 
wonders whether Malaysia will continue to set a poor 
precedent for other states in the region, or will address 
its own track record that has fallen considerably short 
of international norms. 
As it currently stands, however, one is tempted to 
weigh in on the latter. The speeches indicate that the 
intensified clampdown on civil and political rights is 
hidden behind a thick veneer of humanitarian goodwill. 
What is more alarming in this regard, however, is the 
posturing of the ruling UMNO against the issue of 
human rights violations and the ideal of multiethnic 
coexistence: it regards Shiism as a divisive force 
amongst the population. Although this claim might be 
far-fetched, the Islamic sect is certainly a source of 
vexation for the UMNO and its conservative supporters. 
government.12 Since the May 2013 elections, more than 
a dozen senior politicians and activists have landed on 
court for even tweeting memos the government did 
not approve of. The Printing Press and Publication 
Act (PPPA) is another holdover from the previous 
administration: it requires that the publishing houses 
apply for a government permit and have the content of 
their publications approved by the relevant authorities, 
who reserve the right to revoke these permits at any 
time at the behest of individual will.13
Another source of disquietude is the rampant anti-
sectarianism. Anti-Shia sentiments have been on the 
rise in Malaysia since the Islamic Revolution of 1979 
unleashed a myriad wave of emigration from Iran. 
According to the government estimates, the Shia in 
Malaysia have evolved into a sizeable community 
of around 250,000 subscribers, 100,000 of which is 
concentrated in the Malaysian capital.14 Despite this 
anti-sectarianism that had been simmering beneath 
the surface, Kuala Lumpur had hitherto not played the 
center-stage for any large-scale anti-Shia protestations. 
In this regard, the Syrian civil war elevated the simmering 
tension to a boil. Described as an epochal showdown 
between the Shia and the Sunni, this conflict pitted the 
two sects against each other, virtually fragmented the 
population into two opposing camps, and created a 
divide that came into sharper relief as the war ensued. 
Recent developments suggested that anti-sectarianism 
was solidifying. For instance, in September 2013, the 
Mufti Datuk Zahidi Wan hosted a seminar at the Islamic 
Centre in Kuala Lumpur with the title “Facing the Shiite 
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Virus.” The fact that the Islamic Centre in the Malaysian 
capital, a government venue, hosted an event that 
directly antagonized the Shia population is telling: the 
concept of a Malaysian Muslim community was being 
redefined at the exclusion of the non-Sunnis. The Mufti 
also likened Shiism to bottled poison, and even went as 
far as to suggest that the administration should break 
its diplomatic relations with Iran.15 He also advised the 
leadership to emulate the precedent set by Morocco in 
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attempt to crush the movements that threaten Najib’s 
grip on power.24 Ibrahim had first been accused of 
“sodomizing a political aide” in 2008, but the charges 
were dropped in 2012 for lack of evidentiary support. 
The court overturned his acquittal in March 2014 on 
account of some purported charges brought against 
Ibrahim by a “private individual,” yet the charges remain 
questionable.25 The fact that Ibrahim’s coalition posed 
the gravest threat to an UMNO victory in 2013 has raised 
suspicions that the reopening of the charge might have 
been politically motivated. Indeed, Ibrahim’s career as 
the leader of the opposition has now been derailed. Not 
only is he disqualified from running in the upcoming 
elections in 2018, but his imprisonment could also 
shatter the coalition he is leading, thereby squeezing 
out any form of dissent or organized resistance to the 
government. 
Some might be tempted to think that this high-
profile trial could make matters worse for Najib. The 
severe criticism it received from Mahathir Mohamad, 
Malaysia’s longest-serving Prime Minister for 22 years 
from 1981 to 2003, has propelled Malaysia into the 
limelight – the very scenario Najib would have wanted 
to avoid.26 Mahathir also rebuked Najib’s purchasing 
of an expensive jet and his wife’s shopping sprees; 
questioned the UMNO’s chance of being re-elected 
in 2018; and the criticized the imprisonment of the 
members of the opposition for murky sedition charges. 
It should nevertheless be noted that Najib’s core 
support base is unlikely to be bothered by the arrests 
of journalists, media personnel or the members of 
Anwar’s family.27
This backsliding in fundamental freedoms and judicial 
independence is a clear sign of the Prime Minister’s 
fundamental insecurity, and signals that he is likely 
to “do whatever it takes” to prevent Malaysia from 
becoming an object of criticism for international 
lobbyists. This is why Malaysia has voted in favor of 
only those resolutions that will not have the country 
entangled within a web of alliances and commitments. 
Limiting the sphere of the country’s activism, Najib will 
have calculated, also limits the scope of attention it 
receives; this, in return, “protects” the administration 
from being pressured into pushing into force any 
policies that may cost the ruling party its support-base. 
The Islamic State in Malaysia
In August 2014, there appeared on Facebook photos 
of a 52-year old Malaysian jihadist, formerly a member 
The trends indicate that the Shia Malays throw their 
electoral weight behind the main opposition party, the 
Malaysian Islamists.20 Najib is therefore likely to have 
presumed that they were partly to “blame” for his loss 
of popular vote in May 2013 elections.21
Fearful of a further erosion of public support and 
being ousted in the next round of elections, Najib has 
intensified his efforts to cling on to his support-base. In 
an effort to secure their backing, he concentrates on their 
credentials. This base consists of ultra-conservative 
Malays, who want the national administration to govern 
in the name of the Sunni Muslims only and the UMNO 
to promote Muslim supremacy.22 They articulate an 
extreme brand of Islam, completely disconnected 
from the enlightened traditions and interpretations of 
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the region. Its cadres have previously blocked Najib’s 
attempts to widen 1Malaysia’s scope of application, 
and thus ruining the Prime Minister’s efforts to coopt 
the non-Muslim vote. They have even criticized the 
provincial administrations in Sabah and Sarawak for 
their perfunctory adherence to the Sharia Law and 
called for a stricter application of hudud punishments. 
These supporters are also responsible for much of anti-
sectarian violence that runs rampant across Malaysia. 
While critics of the government are buried under unfair 
charges, those sympathetic to Najib are given free reign 
to incite violence and preach incendiary messages; 
they have even called for the mass burning of bibles 
and telling Chinese and Indian Malays “to go back 
home.”23 This politicized approach to religion allows 
these right-wing groups to speak with impunity and act 
with exemption from the injurious consequences for 
their actions.
The imprisonment of Anwar Ibrahim in February 2015 
on sodomy charges, the leader of the three-party 
coalition in opposition to UMNO, was also connected 
to Najib’s political ambitions. It should be seen as an 
of Kumpula Mujahedin Malaysia, that had died in battle 
in Syria. His photo was “liked” by thousands of online 
users, who commented that the man had achieved 
a successful transition into heaven.28 In October 
2014, an advert-style back-page photo in Dabiq, an 
IS publication in English, featured a photo with three 
Southeast Asians along with a small child. The most 
recent development is a minute-long YouTube video 
that surfaced on 15 February 2014: it depicts four 
men with masks, who speak of their plans to bomb the 
courthouse in order to emblemize their mistrust in the 
judicial system.  
The Islamic State conducts a recruitment campaign 
through social media. So far, these appeals seemed 
to have captivated some audience, and an estimated 
number of 80 Malaysians have so far joined the 
Islamic State in Syria.29 The most significant mass-
arrest happened in October, when 14 people were 
detained while attempting to travel to Syria.30 One of 
those arrested was a senior government engineer 
with the Ministry of Energy, Green Technology and 
Water. Another government employee, whose position 
has hitherto not been disclosed, is reported to have 
joined the ranks of the IS in December 2013 for four 
months, after which he volunteered to return home and 
motivate recruitment. Perhaps the most bewildering 
development that has recently taken place was the 
arrest of a family of 4 along with their 14-year old child, 
who was in the process of arranging their travel to Syria. 
The police discovered pamphlets and jihad literature in 
their home that might have been employed to inculcate 
jihadi ideology into potential recruits.31
Encouraged by the success of the IS, four new militant 
groups have commenced operations and already 
slipped in under the government’s radar. Identified 
only through their acronyms (BKAW, BAK, ADI, and 
Dimzia), they are believed to be operating from the 
states of Selangor and Perka. Neither their affiliation 
with the grander fundamentalist chains nor their modus 
operandi have been teased out. The authorities see 
them as “permutations of earlier terrorist cells,” such 
as Jemaah Islamiyah or KMM, and suspect that they 
might even have been trained with the Abu Sayyaf in 
the neighboring Philippines.32
South Asian countries are certainly not strangers 
to extremist groups. There is, however, an element 
of novelty in the composition of these new threats. 
These organizations are bent on creating a “super” 
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onwards to Syria via Turkey. Some have even travelled 
to Saudi Arabia under the pretense of performing the 
umrah, but then traversed the border into Jordan before 
securing a passage into IS-controlled territories.35 The 
recent ban in China’s largely Muslim Xinjiang province 
on large beards and Islamic clothing is also likely 
to prompt a new wave of emigration.36 In its latest 
crackdown on religious fanaticism, the city of Urumqi 
in the Xinjiang region prohibited women from wearing 
Islamic garments in public.37 If faced with deportation, 
these Chinese Muslims might arrive at Malaysia’s 
doorstep, where they could easily be coopted by the 
IS functionaries. 
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Islamic Caliphate in the region that encompasses 
Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, southern Thailand 
and southern Philippines. Whether this caliphate is 
meant to supersede that envisaged by al-Baghdadi or 
complement it is up for speculation. What is certain, 
however, is that they are likely to pose a graver threat 
to the region than their counterparts operating in 
Indonesia, as the militants subscribe to, and fiercely 
champion, the Islamic State’s ambitions.33
Countering Terrorism
Malaysia is fortunate not to have had any terrorist attacks 
on its own soil; yet, with the changing face of terrorism, 
it is becoming more difficult to monitor potential attacks. 
Online blogs, Facebook and YouTube accounts may be 
created and deleted with relative ease without drawing 
much suspicion from the authorities. There is therefore 
a growing need for vigilance. Malaysia will especially 
have to adjust its liberal visa policies: under the current 
visa regulations, Syrian and Yemeni citizens may claim 
visas upon arrival – a loose practice that renders these 
borders vulnerable to exploitation.34 Also, it is easy to 
travel to Brunei, Hong Kong, China, or several other 
European hubs from Kuala Lumpur, and then proceed 
What has Malaysia done to relegate the fundamentalist 
threat to the sidelines, then? Once again, Najib opted 
for a “moderate” approach to combatting extremism. In 
his speech to the 69th General Assembly in September 
2014, the Prime Minister identified “moderation” as 
involving “all people to pursue their religion with peace” 
and ensuring maximum participation in the political 
process.38 He claimed, indeed not incorrectly, that 
governments would benefit from committing to more 
inclusive politics and addressing the socio-economic 
factors that drove citizens to radicalization.39 In fact, 
adopting “softer” measures is a smart tactic. Since 
ideologies are not popularized on the battlefield 
but disseminated on the Internet, the international 
community’s “message of peace” may find a larger 
audience if promulgated through social media.40 
In this regard, Najib made an important point. He asserted 
that the governments should explore ways to improve 
the living conditions of their populace, and discussed 
his plans to develop the infrastructure in Sabah and 
Sarawak and bolster the security apparatus in Sabah, 
where the threat of extremism remains at its most 
intense. As will be discussed below, Najib might have 
propounded this “softer” approach for other motives. 
This, however, should not gloss over the importance 
of his claim – that infrastructure development “will go 
a longer way in stemming extremism than any boots 
or bullets.”41
Aside from the mass-arrests discussed above, 
Malaysia’s counter-terrorism efforts have yielded 
negligible results. In January 2015, an IS-fighter 
that addresses himself by the pseudonym Abu Hud 
announced on the terrorist outfit’s website that jihadists 
should avoid crossing into Malaysia, identifying this 
transit route as “suicidal.”42 This, however, has not been 
substantiated with any factual evidence, and could 
therefore be a cunning plan designed to divert attention 
away from the borders. It should also be noted that 
Malaysia has proven apathetic towards tackling threats 
of this nature. A strong case in point are the missions 
to find Malaysian Air Flight MH370 that disappeared on 
8 March 2014, and MH17 that was shot down on 17 
March 2014 by the Russian-backed rebels in Ukraine.43 
Although the authorities have reassured the public that 
“they were doing their best,” nothing belonging to the 
aircraft has been discovered. As Tim Clark, the head 
of Emirates Airlines, have also pointed out, the fact that 
“the executive refused to give any details on what was 
on the cargo hold of the airplane” reflects poorly on 
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Malaysia’s efforts in this regard.44
Malaysia’s lethargy perhaps becomes less of a shock, 
when one factors in Najib’s silence vis-à-vis the Islamic 
State, when the group first made the headlines in 
Summer 2014. Prior to the wide circulation of gruesome 
beheading videos, the Prime Minister had even 
applauded the group’s resilience in the fights against 
its enemies. In a speech delivered to commemorate 
the 20th anniversary of the founding of UMNO’s Cheras 
branch, Najib averred that his party “must emulate the 
bravery of the ISIS fighters” to survive the upcoming 
elections and remain firmly anchored in power.45 
Of course, Malaysia has changed tack since then: it 
now not only condemns the atrocities committed by 
the terrorist outfit, but also confirmed that the country 
would be onboard with launching air attacks upon the 
IS-controlled territories.46 What is significant, however, 
is that Malaysia chose to remain on the sidelines of an 
international development, and broke its silence only 
when it had become “safe” and absolutely necessary 
to react. 
There are also several reasons why Najib might at first 
have been hesitant to adopt a raucous tone vis-à-vis 
the IS. An active fight would have put the country under 
risk, from which Malaysia would not gain anything 
significant. This is why Najib is likely to have played 
it safe, until a high level of international attention 
became concentrated on the IS. Also, the initial profile 
of the IS as another Sunni-Muslim outfit, waging war 
against the West, could have appealed to Malaysia’s 
conservatives.47 In this case, Najib would have chosen 
to wait, and not advance into any commitments, until 
a red line had been drawn; beheading videos and a 
large-scale Malaysian recruitment would have drawn 
this red-line.  
Oil, Economy and a Non-international Malaysia
A careful analysis confirms that Malaysia does not 
need the resources of the Middle Eastern markets. 
The Malaysian oil reserves, for instance, are the fourth 
largest in Asia, after China, India and Vietnam.48 The 
country is also the world’s second largest exporter of 
LNG in 2013 after Qatar, with a natural gas production 
capacity that is currently being improved to serve the 
growing domestic demand. For instance, the recent 
investment in deep-water fields in the states of Sabah 
and Sarawak is likely to allow Malaysia to maintain its 
high natural gas production levels. The western part 
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of the country might be suffering from limited gas 
resources and rising demand, but the authorities have 
chosen to combat this shortcoming by encouraging 
the funding the regasification terminals. In peninsular 
Malaysia, where the revamped energy regeneration 
capacity has not proven equal to the task of curbing 
power outages, one witnesses now a widespread 
switch to coal, diesel and renewable sources.49
In light of these developments, has the Middle East 
then lapsed into irrelevance? Although Libya is the 
11th most important import origin of crude petroleum 
for Malaysia, it still only accounts for a share of 2.41% 
of the country’s total petroleum imports. Reviewing the 
ten largest import partners in this sector (Saudi Arabia, 
Vietnam, Nigeria, Gabon, UAE, Azerbaijan, Australia, 
Iran, Kuwait, Qatar) furthermore leads one to the 
conclusion that Malaysia tends to conduct its economic 
engagement with the regional states.50
This is certainly not to suggest that Kuala Lumpur has 
been averse to enhance investment flows with the 
region. In fact, a bit less than a month before the Syrian 
civil war erupted, both countries had agreed to form a 
Joint Trade Committee on 1 February 2011 and signed 
a Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation in 
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Dhabi based Higher Corporation for Specialized 
Economic Zones also declared its intention to form 
partnerships with Malaysian Business Council and 
Malaysian International Chamber of Commerce, and 
work in tandem towards expanding the scope of South 
Asian financial activism in downstream oil and gas 
industries.53
The Middle East and the Gulf, however, is already 
too crowded with more ambitious South/East Asian 
companies, making it virtually impossible for Malaysia 
to “become the primary gateway for Middle East-Asia 
business partnerships.”54 This is why Najib, as the 2015 
ASEAN Chair, has professed that he would be working 
on Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
– which will become the world’s largest free trade 
agreement that involves Japan, South Korea, India, 
Australia, New Zealand, along with ASEAN countries.55 
Given the fact that the competition in the Gulf is likely 
to render Malaysia at a competitive disadvantage, 
Najib has chosen to concentrate his economic focus 
on the neighborhood, decreasing the likelihood of any 
economic cooperation formed between Malaysia and 
any of the Arab Spring countries. 
Conclusion  
This paper has argued that Malaysia’s foreign policy 
vis-à-vis the Arab Spring has been characterized by 
prudence. The reason why Malaysia followed a low-
profile line of policy toward these countries, however, 
hinges on the country’s domestic situation. In this 
regard, this study has attributed explanatory power 
to the composition of Najib’s electorate, and argued 
that Malaysia’s foreign policy became linked to the 
Prime Minister’s domestic concerns. Accordingly, 
how to retain the loyalty of his support base became 
the guiding principle and the primary driver of Najib’s 
foreign policy. 
Malaysia also does not have its own vision for the 
Middle East, and is far from trying to forge more 
advantageous conditions by altering the political 
landscape. Its chief objective is, on the contrary, to 
stand idly on the sidelines and not to get entangled 
within the web of responsibilities. In return, this allows 
the country to keep international attention away from 
a number of human rights violations at home; the 
“sticky situation” is that by not becoming an object of 
media focus, Najib turns a blind eye to the deplorable 
domestic situation that, he hopes, will secure him the 
votes of his conservative supporters. 
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promotion of trade.51 The investment flows between 
the countries remained very minimal thereafter, but 
it is import to note the willingness on both sides to 
expand upon existing relations: projects had included 
construction-level developments on the Damascus 
International Airport, renovating the parking spaces as 
well as the passenger terminal.52
In 2013, moreover, Malaysia showed signs of 
determination to diversify its market, and reached 
out to Saudi Arabia and the UAE for investment 
opportunities. The UAE channeled funds towards 
machinery equipment, petroleum and chemical 
industries, whereas the Saudi investors concentrated 
mainly on the Iskandor Johor Economic Development 
Area in southern Peninsular Malaysia. The Abu 
Then, Malaysia did not formulate any overarching 
strategy vis-à-vis the developments in the Middle East. 
For Najib, entanglement promised no merits. Instead, 
the leadership worded its statements cautiously, 
declined to throw its weight behind the more ambitious 
project of a military intervention, and confined the sphere 
of their discussions to the range of “safer” topics. In the 
8
absence of any political or economic benefits to derive 
from active involvement, Malaysia therefore remained 
silent, hoping to silently slip through the radar of the 
international community. 
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